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Abstract 
The phenomenon of inter-organizational cooperation in networks is becoming increasingly important, and as such there are 
numerous companies which participate in various networks. This is due to the advantages offered by participation in such 
networks, e.g. access to the resources of partners, the opportunity to learn from partners, reduction of risk, etc. Even the negative 
aspects of functioning within the network do nothing to reduce the attractiveness of this concept. It should be noted, however, 
that any inter-organizational cooperation is combined with the likelihood that certain negative phenomena may arise, i.e. 
pathologies which reduce the attractiveness of this type of activity. Some of these pathologies are similar to those occurring in 
any organization, while the others are a specific feature of network organizations. 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the pathologies most frequently observed in inter-organizational networks. In contrast to 
pathologies resulting from a specific network structure (hereinafter referred to as structural pathologies) we have labelled such 
phenomena simple pathologies. Our analysis begins with a presentation of the importance of network organizations in 
contemporary business. We then present the major pathologies in networks and the varieties thereof. Subsequently, a comparison 
is made between pathologies in the organization vs. the pathologies in the networks. Finally, we have described the ways to avoid 
pathologies in networks, as well as summarised the potential solutions. The paper utilises the publications available in the 
literature, as well as the authors’ experience in creating network organizations. Although it is impossible to identify a universal 
solution to the issue of pathologies in the networks (because their sources are complex and systemic in nature), knowledge of 
such phenomena can reduce the risk of their re-occurrence. 
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1. Introduction 
Network organizations are a common form of functioning in the modern business world. The phenomenon of 
inter-organizational cooperation in networks is becoming increasingly important, and as such there are numerous 
companies which participate in various networks. This phenomenon has been gaining momentum for the last two 
decades. In the 1980s such corporations as IBM, AT&T, Olivetti and Toshiba formed over 100 cooperation 
agreements apiece. In the main, this can be attributed to the advantages offered by participation in such networks, 
e.g. access to the resources of partners, the opportunity to learn from partners, reduction of risk, etc. Such benefits 
can be distinguished according to the theory of transaction costs, game theory and the resource approach. 
Organizations will seek to create multilateral network connections if cooperation creates greater benefits than 
market transactions or hierarchical structures (Williamson, 1991). Functioning in the network reduces opportunistic 
behaviour (freeriding) through the repeatability of the transactions and the resulting increase in the level of trust. 
Network connections reduce operating costs in a highly turbulent environment in which independent functioning is 
subject to high transaction costs (Walker and Weber, 1984). In such a case, the costs of functioning within the 
network structures are lower than those which arise from independent activity. At the same time, the networks are 
burdened by much lower bureaucratic costs, compared to those in hierarchical structures (Park, 1996). Multilateral 
network links reduce transaction costs but also increase transaction value, which may lead to an increase in the 
bargaining power of the network members compared to the other participants in the market (Clarke-Hill et al. 2003). 
Even the negative aspects of functioning within the network do nothing to reduce the attractiveness of this 
concept. It should be noted, however, that any inter-organizational cooperation is combined with the likelihood that 
certain negative phenomena may arise, i.e. pathologies which reduce the attractiveness of this type of activity. Some 
of these pathologies are similar to those occurring in any organization, while others are a specific feature of network 
organizations. 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the pathologies most frequently observed in inter-organizational networks. The 
literature in the field of inter-firm cooperation is very limited and concentrates mostly on the creation of network 
connections (Larson and Starr, 1993), taking into account bilateral relationships (Chwistecka-Dudek and Sroka 
2000; Cygler 2002) and multilateral strategic alliances (Child et al., 2005; Sroka and Hittmár, 2013), both between 
competitors (Bleeke and Ernst, 1993; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Cygler, 2010) and between suppliers and customers 
(Yoshino and Rangan, 1995; Dyer, 1996). Therefore our paper somewhat fills a gap in existing research in this field. 
In contrast to pathologies resulting from a specific network structure (hereinafter referred to as structural 
pathologies, e.g. Cygler and Sroka, 2014) we have labelled such phenomena simple pathologies. The paper utilizes 
the publications available in the literature as well as the practical experience of the authors in creating network 
organizations.  
2. The importance of networks in modern economy  
There is a wide selection of data confirming the importance of networks in the modern economy. This strategy is 
increasing in popularity worldwide, irrespective of sectors and sizes of companies. On the other hand, the fact is that 
global corporations tend to be most involved in cooperation in the form of networks. The following data 
characterizes the importance of networks in modern business: 
x approximately 10–20 percent of the revenues of multinational corporations is generated from cooperation with 
other firms (Chaturvedi and Gaur, 2009); 
x Apple’s portfolio of ties with EMI, Google, Salesforce.com, Microsoft, and other firms was key to its success. 
These ties enabled Apple to focus on its strengths, such as architectural design, while leveraging their partners’ 
resources and market positions (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009);  
x In ten years, Sun Microsystems, established in 1982, grew to $ 3.2 billion in sales and $ 284 million in profits. 
This remarkable growth was achieved by Sun’s alliance network (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995); 
x Percentage sales generated from alliances among the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations rose from less than 2% in 
1980 to 19 % in 1996, and reached 35 % in 2002 (Tian Xie and Johnston, 2004). 
x The aerospace industry is controlled by two networks, those of Boeing and Airbus. Each consists of more than 
100 partners (Freidheim, 1999).  
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x Most of the major airlines lead networks of smaller and regional carriers in code-sharing alliances. The 
pharmaceutical industry is supported by networks of biotechnology firms and suppliers, cross-licenses, and 
distribution agreements (Child et al. 2005, 145). 
x American Corning has a wide portfolio of alliances which generate 25 percent of its revenues. The first of these 
were built up roughly 50 years ago (Bamford et al. 2003). 
x Strategic alliances have consistently produced a return on investment of nearly 17 percent among the top 2,000 
companies in the world for nearly a decade. This return is 50 percent more than the average return on investment 
produced by the companies overall. Moreover, the 25 companies most active in alliances achieved a 17.2 percent 
return on equity – 40 percent more than the average return on equity of the Fortune 500 (Harbison et al., 2000). 
x Corporations such as Toyota receive over 1000 alliance proposals monthly (Obłój 2007, 16). 
x In the airline industry, more than 80 % of airlines are members of such networks, whilst the others either occupy 
a niche position or are low-cost carriers. 
Samsung is one of the leading global corporations, and has undergone extensive growth thanks to inter-
organizational cooperation (Table 1). Since the 1990s, Samsung has increasingly globalized its activities; 
electronics, particularly mobile phones and semiconductors, have become its most important source of income.  
Table 1. Selected companies in Samsung’s inter-organizational network 
No. Company Date Area of cooperation 
1. Nokia Apr. 2007 Co-developed technology for handsets and DVB-H standardization 
solutions 
2. Limo Jan. 2007 Established a joint venture for developing a Linux platform (Samsung 
Electronics, Vodafone, DoCoMo, Motorola and NEC) 
3. Alcatel Oct. 2006 Cooperated on satellite DVB-H 
4. Sony (S-LCD) Jul. 2006 Jointly invested in 8th-generation LCD line (2200 mm × 2500 mm 
motherglass) 
5. IBM Mar. 2006 Co-developed and marketed technologies for industrial printer solutions 
6. Intel & Microsoft Mar. 2006 Co-developed UMPCs 
7. Discovery Sept. 2005 Cooperated on high-definition contents 
8. Salvarani Jul. 2005 Co-developed new built-in products combining household electronics and 
furniture 
9. Sun Microsystems Jul. 2005 Cooperated in business solutions and next-generation business computing 
systems 
10. Covad Jul. 2005 Supplied access gateways 
11. Lowe’s Jul. 2005 Supplied household electronics to 1,100 Lowe’s stores 
12. VDL Feb. 2005 Cooperated in commercialization of terrestrial DMB 
13. Charter Jan. 2005 Co-developed cable broadcasting receiver and set-top box for digital TV 
Full-Duplex service 
14. KDDI Jan. 2005 Supplied CDMA2000 1×EV-DO network equipment in Eastern Japan 
15. Bang & Olufsen Nov. 2004 Partnered in home theater business 
16. Kent State 
University 
Oct. 2004 Co-developed display technologies 
17. Qualcomm Jul. 2004 Cooperated in MDDI (Mobile Display Data Interface) technology 
18. Toshiba (TSST) Apr. 2004 Developed and marketed optical storage devices 
19. Sony (S-LCD) Mar. 2004 Established joint venture for 7th generation LCD (1870 × 2200 mm) line 
20. IBM Mar. 2004 Co-developed nano-logic process technologies 
21. Dell Jan. 2004 Supplied multi-functional laser printers 
22. Hewlett-Packard Sept. 2003 Shared technology for ink-jet printers 
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23. Disney Sept. 2003 Supplied “Movie Beam” set-top box for VOD 
24. Napster Sept. 2003 Co-developed and marketed Samsung-Napster player 
25. Sony Aug. 2003 Expanded and consolidated memory stick business 
26. NEC Jul. 2003 Cooperated in high-end business computer systems 
27. Matsushita Jan. 2003 Standardized technology, co-produced and jointly marketed DVD 
recorders 
28. Best Buy Jul. 2002 Sold side-by-side refrigerators through a network of more than 500 
retailers 
29. Microsoft Nov. 2001 Co-developed digital household electronics 
Source: own elaboration 
An analysis of the data presented in the table allows us to state that:  
x Samsung’s network takes the form of bilateral alliances, which diminishes the scope of potential conflicts 
between the network members;  
x Both competitors and non-competitors are partners of the Samsung group; 
x The network continues to grow in that new partners are obtained several times per year.  
Most importantly, however is that Samsung’s position has radically improved due to network cooperation. 
Nowadays it is one of the leading players in the world; today Samsung exerts powerful influence on South Korea’s 
economic development. Its revenue was equal to 17 % of South Korea’s $1.082 billion GDP (Daniel, 2013). 
Moreover, it is estimated that Samsung will reach a total global sales figure of $400 billion by 2020. 
There is one more reason for engagement into the networks, irrespective of the arguments presented earlier. It is 
always better to cooperate than to compete, especially if competition has the potential to have devastating effects. 
There are no winners in such situations. Such devastating competition always leads to the reduction of prices, which 
in extreme cases may lead to company bankruptcy. Such a situation played a role in the troubled performance of a 
number of Polish construction companies in the period of 2012–2013, notwithstanding the fact that there were 
indeed other contributory factors. 
3. Pathologies in the networks and the main types of thereof  
Pathology is a concept which is inextricably linked with every organization. There is no universal definition of 
“pathology” in terms of the organization; in its basic form, the concept of pathology is derived from Greek and refes 
to the science of disease. According to Pasieczny (2012), when speaking about pathology within the organization, 
one keeps in mind a situation in which there is a significant and long-lasting functional irregularity. Kieżun (2012, 
16) claims that pathology within an organization is “a relatively permanent disability, which causes waste in the 
economic and (or) moral sense, exceeding the limits of social tolerance.” In turn Kopaliński (1970) claims that 
pathology should be considered as a morbid state of the unit which differs from correct functioning. The New 
Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language (1991, 735) defines pathology as the study of disease 
and all its manifestations, especially of the functional and structural changes caused by it.  
Pathologies in networks are characterized by different intensity, and appear in diversified configurations. A 
frequent organizational pathology is conflict, which may relate to conflicts between particular employees, groups 
(company vs. company), and also between the unit and the group. Network organizations are especially exposed to 
such types of phenomena, especially in relation to conflicts of interest between companies. The multiplicity of 
network members, and very frequently the divergent interests among them (direct competition) mean that avoidance 
of conflicts is impossible. 
The most serious pathologies present in networks are conflicts between companies, especially if the network is 
large and has hundreds of member companies. However, this relates not to the conflict itself, but the excessive level 
thereof. It should be noted that the conflict itself, when at a relatively low level, may be favourable and function as 
evidence of mutually beneficial cooperation between the parties. The causes of conflicts in networks are most 
frequently the result of: 
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x The way in which partners specify their patent and ownership rights. These rights depend on the type of 
technology and the effectiveness of legal protection mechanisms. 
x Antitrust law, which determines whether the use of certain exclusivity clauses to protect the interest of a partner 
is permitted. 
x Differences in organizational cultures and difficulties in adapting the different styles and methods of management 
of particular members. 
x Trust and the degree of engagement of the partners (Chwistecka-Dudek and Sroka, 2008, 95-96). 
It should be noted, however, that it is not possible to avoid conflict in its entirety. There are many reasons for 
this, related both to the nature of member companies (e.g. direct competition between them), as well as the type of 
network itself (e.g. an equal-partner network, dominated network, etc.). Doz and Hamel (2006, 319) claim that the 
larger the network, the more chance of conflict occurrence which mostly relates to the different interests of member 
companies. If the network consists of hundreds of companies, the more likely it is that direct competitors will exist 
within the network. On the one hand, this raises a duty to precisely define the goal of each alliance in the network, 
and on the other – to define the limits of cooperation, because these two factors will limit the potential areas of 
conflict between the companies. This issue is especially important in equal-partner networks. It is impossible to 
avoid competition between them, if there are such a large number of companies in the network. IBM, which is 
mainly engaged in alliances in the areas of computers and software (its core business) may be regarded as an 
example. IBM has entered into alliances with both direct competitors and non-competitors (Dittrich et al. 2007). The 























Fig. 1. Nokia’s alliance network 
Source: Dittrich 2006 
Even limits to internal competition within a network do not completely eliminate conflicts between individual 
companies. There are a large number of companies within the majority of network organizations, so the likelihood 
of conflict occurrence is much higher as a result. This applies mostly to issues related to financial and technological 
aspects, as well as “softer” aspects such as cultural and interpersonal differences. These have a negative effect, as 
managers have to concentrate on conflict resolution instead of ostensibly more important tasks. Therefore, from the 
very beginning, a network should develop mechanisms to resolve conflicts to avoid such situations continuing to 
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develop and reach their peak (Child et al. 2005, 64–65). The establishment of formal mechanisms for dispute 
resolution and conflict management encourage the exchange of knowledge and ideas between the parties (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1998). 
Equal-partner networks, involving many partners holding a relatively similar position in the network, are 
particularly exposed to the occurrence of conflicts. To a lesser extent, this problem affects dominated networks, 
those being the networks in which one partner (or more) holds a dominant position. One may claim that the best 
approach to conflict resolution is to avoid such situations through the selection of an appropriate network structure. 
As an example, Toyota has achieved high levels of productivity by creating a strong network identity, with clear 
rules of entrance and participation in the group. Its production knowledge is considered to be the property of the 
whole group, and the clear definition of the roles of the various participants eliminates potential scope for conflict. It 
is also stressed that the network should not feature an excess of members performing similar roles (Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000). 
An excessive level of conflict does not constitute the only pathology found in a network. The others include: 
x Organizational schizophrenia, e.g. if the network declares the principles of partnership and relationships with its 
members and, in practice, acts in quite the opposite way in imposing its own principles and rules. This may be 
particularly important in dominated networks. The Japanese firm Toyota acts in quite the opposite way within its 
keiretsu group. Toyota selectively develops relationships with its suppliers. Toyota subcontractors were 
reorganized into tiers through the concentration of orders, intensified specialization and increased dependence on 
particular customers (Fruin and Nishiguchi 1993, 225–246). In the tiered structure, approximately 180 first-tier 
suppliers contract to several thousand lower-tier subcontractors that, in turn, contract to tens of thousands third-
tier suppliers (Kogut 2000). First-tier suppliers have the largest portfolio of orders. Such a structure has several 
advantages, e.g. it allows for the differentiation of resources possessed by particular sub-suppliers. To participate 
in the first tier, suppliers are required to prove, codify and share their competences with one another.  
x One of the most important features of keiretsu is the approach to problem-solving. Large companies which 
assume key positions in the network usually assist their members to solve operational problems (Hagen and 
Choe, 1998). This gives precedence to cooperation among partners, develops trust and diminishes the areas of 
potential conflict. Cooperation in the network and the transfer of knowledge among particular members is linked 
with an improvement in the effectiveness of the suppliers (Kotabe et al. 2003). Toyota also provides its partners 
with the opportunity to take advantage of training and assistance in terms of expert knowledge on manufactured 
components (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995). Toyota’s network has solved three fundamental dilemmas with 
regard to knowledge sharing by devising methods to: 1. motivate members to participate and openly share 
valuable knowledge (while preventing undesirable spillovers to competitors), 2. prevent free riders, and 3. reduce 
the costs associated with finding and accessing different types of valuable knowledge (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). 
Moreover, keiretsu companies which cannot identify the source of their problems can always count on the 
assistance of specialists from the group (Liker and Choi, 2006). 
x excessive growth of network structures; the consequences of this phenomenon manifest especially in the growth 
of the management structure. There are networks which do not possess their own specialized organizational units 
to deal with this issue, and network management is done by other organizational units over and above their daily 
duties (e.g. M&A department). More frequently, however, there are specialized units whose task is to manage the 
network. The larger the network, the greater the need to create such an organizational unit. On the other hand, 
this must be undertaken within the framework of reasonable limits. If such a unit is to be a large, inert “body”, it 
is better to delegate the management of such a network to an external organization. 
x corruption;  
x bureaucracy.  
A network, instead of generating growth opportunities for its members, may also become a “prison” for the 
companies associated. It may expose the company to the risk of becoming stuck in poor relationships with the other 
entities (Gulati et al., 2000), as well as bringing about the formation of an inefficient management structure 
(Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). Such a situation typically has long-term consequences for such entities, because they 
remain in such relationships for an extended period of time. Many U.S. companies have formed cooperative 
partnerships with Japanese companies since the early 70s. Japanese companies quickly acquired the skills of their 
partners (market, marketing, etc.) through the acquisition of organizational learning. As a result, U.S. companies 
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were forced to continue the relationship, because such a situation was safer for them than functioning independently. 
As one of the managers has stated, it was the classic syndrome of a hunter sitting on a tiger: any attempt to descend 
brings the threat of being eaten. This situation is mainly a result of an inability to predict the direction of the 
evolution of the network and the lack of certainty that a network member will derive benefits from the partnership 
which are proportional to its contribution. 
As a result of the dissatisfaction of the network members, frictions and tensions may arise between them. Such 
tensions mostly result from their position in the network. This prevents effective competition and may lead to the 
restructuring of the network. If this happens, the following actions can be taken (Bamford et al. 2003, s. 258–270):  
x revolt of the members, 
x consolidation of the leadership,  
x structural reforms,  
x collapse of the network. 
The frictions and tensions may also result in a re-configuration of the company’s position within the network, 
which makes managers reluctant to enter the network. In extreme cases, the situation may arise in which 
membership in the network is less favourable than functioning outside the network system. 
4. Pathologies in the networks vs. pathologies in the organization: comparison 
Table 2 presents a comparison between pathologies in the organization vs. pathologies in the networks. 
Table 2. Pathologies in the organization vs. pathologies in the networks: comparison 
Criteria 
 
Pathology in the organization  Pathology in the network  
Excessive level of 
conflict  
Widely observed  
Different types  
Frequently observed. 
Conflicts between particular employees, 
companies (company vs. company) as well as 
between the unit and a group.  
Organizational 
schizophrenia  
Exists  Exists  
Excessive growth of 
network structures 
Widely observed, depending on 
the size of the company  
Exists  
Bureaucracy Exists  Exists  
 
Corruption  Exists and is characterized by a 
diverse range depending on the 
country, organizational culture, 
etc. 
Exists, however the scale of this phenomenon is 
smaller than in the organization and relates 
mostly to the certain network types  
Source: own elaboration 
 
An analysis of the data presented allows us to state that pathologies are a feature of an organization as well as a 
network. It is reasonable to put forward the thesis that there are no major differences in this respect. Unfortunately, 
pathologies are a common feature of a modern business. One cannot avoid them, and one can only minimize the 
degree of their negative impact. Preventive actions (or actions minimizing their negative impact) may also be taken.  
5. Ways to avoid pathologies in networks, and proposed solutions  
It is impossible to identify a universal solution to the issue of pathologies within networks. Their origins are 
complex and systemic in nature. However, as in the case of any pathology within an organization, it is also possible 
to reduce its negative impact in relation to the network. One of the options is to take preventive (prophylactic) 
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actions which are based on constant monitoring of changes in the network (e.g. situations of potential conflict) and 
its environment, as well as their systematic acquiescence with the organizational solutions present in the networks. 
Monitoring mechanisms also allow organisations to recognize whether one of the parties is trying to acquire the key 
competences of another entity which facilitates their possible protection against any unauthorized partners. 
Monitoring relates to the entire network in that companies observe the actions of the other network members, 
regardless of whether their behaviour affects them directly. The results of these observations are quickly available to 
the other partners. Such preventive actions may contribute to the reduction of pathology in the network; however, 
they require consistent application in order for this to hold true. 
The potential for conflict between members of the network provides the greatest likelihood of the application of 
preventive actions. Firstly, clear and legible financial procedures and guidelines regarding the protection of key 
competences of member companies may reduce the range of potential conflicts in the network. This requires a 
certain formality, especially in the initial stage of the functioning of the network, and even before the 
commencement of its operations. Formalization also plays an important role in encouraging the exchange of 
information between the parties. Although formal procedures do not guarantee either the quantity or quality of the 
information provided, there are solutions which may prove highly useful, e.g. password access to computer 
networks, the well-documented flow of materials, or the regular dissemination of network performance results. 
Moreover, the transfer of information between members of the network has a positive effect on breaking down 
barriers between managers.  
Because rules exist which determine the level of cooperation between companies in the network, a company that 
violates these regulations will be exposed to sanctions. It should be noted, however, that particular network 
members frequently do not enter into any formal cooperative agreements; therefore the development of such 
agreements requires discussion and building mechanisms other than formal and legal ones. One of the possible 
approaches is the utilisation of so-called “social sanctions” which include “mutual monitoring between the 
participants and a quick transfer of information about the credibility of the partner companies” (Hagen and Choe, 
1998; Boyd 2004). Being aware of the impact of its behaviour on external perceptions, the company acts more 
sensibly and less opportunistically, in order to avoid negatively affecting its image. One should remember that one 
of the most important tasks of the network members is maintaining network integrity. This relates to the proper 
condition of the network and its particular members. 
However, if a company abuses the network, three possibilities should be considered: 
x The exclusion of the company from the group due to its disintegrative activities. Such an action also has an 
educational aspect regarding other members of the network.  
x The exclusion of a network member whose reputation negatively affects the group because of its activities (e.g. 
illegal practices in business, conflict of interest, etc.). 
x The exclusion of a member which demonstrates problems with support, leading to a lack of customer satisfaction. 
We can observe such a situation in the case of Japanese companies operating in keiretsu groups. The mutual 
interdependence of the companies within the network also manifests itself in the fact that companies are less prone 
to opportunistic behaviour towards each other. Possible sanctions from the dominant company in the network is 
another possible explanation for such behaviour. 
Another possibility is to avoid partners that may cause conflict within the network, or those whose interests 
overlap with the existing business scope of the network members. The limitation of partnerships to well-defined 
areas of cooperation, e.g. geographical areas, may also be a good option. It allows companies to avoid situations in 
which individual members of the network compete with each other in the same areas. The transparency of the 
network members, regardless of their position in the same network, is also regarded as a possible limitation of the 
occurrence of pathology in networks. Such an approach promotes cooperation and builds mutual trust between 
members, as well as eliminates the field of potential conflicts. It is also a clear indication for external observers, 
including potential entrants who see how the network operate and therefore may be more willing to enter it.  
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6. Conclusion 
It is impossible to identify a universal solution to the issue of pathologies within networks. Their sources are 
complex and systemic in nature. Inter-organizational cooperation is associated with a variety of advantages, 
depending on the type and size of the network, the industry in which it operates, or the potential of the company as a 
member of the network. Thanks to access to the knowledge of individual companies in the network, a quicker 
response time to market requirements and customer expectations is achieved. Cooperation within the network also 
allows companies to enter a specific market segment. The network is an interesting possibility to survive in a 
competitive environment especially for small and medium size companies, as they have the possibility of expanding 
and increasing its potential. An additional benefit of networks is the non-competitive environment in which its 
members operate. One should remember, however, that beside the benefits of cooperation, risks arising from this 
strategy should be also analysed. Otherwise, the company could face disappointment, and failure instead of success. 
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